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Introduction i
Asylum - as it exists today in law and practice - originated in ancient customs
toprotect individuals and groups from paricular forms of hardship. The specific
forms which asylum took typically reflected conflct between the needs of the
claimant and the interests of the receiving state. In moral-philosophical terms, this
conflct was formulated as the rights of individuals versus the rights of
communities. In political terms, the conflct - and its outcome - reflected the
power strctures in the historical context in which the refugee movements
unfolded.
Current issues of asylum must likewise be understood in relation to fundamental
issues of law and moral philosophy as well as prevailng strctures of international
relations. This paper wil briefly recount the development of asylum as it was
institutionalized after World War Il, and then identify the main mechanisms
available today. These mechanisms, in turn, wil be assessed with respect to their
adequacy in providing asylum, and the extent to which they represent areasonable
framework for mediating the enduring conflcts between the needs of individuals
and the interests of states in this respect.
The institution of asylum has for some time been under increasing pressure in
much of the industralized world. In the developing world, the problem is rather
to secure sustenance for large flows of refugees who, with varous degrees of
formality, have obtained immediate asylum. This pattern was reinforced by the
fundamental change in international politics known as the end of the Cold War.
Contemporar asylum and refugee conditions thus bear the imprint of the
emergence of a new historical time period - the post-Cold War world.
L. Asylum and refugee flows in the post World War Il period
1.1 Legal framework
1.1.1 Asylum: Theessence of asylum is to enjoy protection outside the reach of
the persecuting agent, customarily taken to be the state of origin. This has
traditionally meant either terrtorial asylum - Le. protection on the territory of
another state - or diplomatic asylum in the Latin American tradition - Le.
within the diplomatic mission of another state which, according to the principle
of extra-terrtoriality, constitutes a piece of sovereign terrtory of that state (Grahl-
Prepared for Expert Group Meeting on Population Distrbution and Migration, Santa Cruz,
Bolivia, 18-22 Januar 1993, organised by the Population Division of the Deparunent of
Economic and Socia Development, United Nations Secretaat, in collaboration with the United
Nations Population Fund (UNF A). I am indebted to Terje Einarsen, Faculty of Law. University
of Bergen, for comments on pars of this paper.
1
Madsen, 1966, Goodwin-Gil, 1983). ff the right to seek asylum is abridged - e.g.
by choking of physical access to points where applications can be lodged - the
potential refugee has no entr and thus no escape. The abilty to seek asylum
therefore appears as the most basic right; it is prior to and distinct from the
outcome of a process which determes eligibilty according to a given definition
of refugee (Plender, 1989).2
The 1951 U.N. Convention on refugees3 - which remains the principal piece of
internationallaw in refugee matters - does not establish an individual' s right to
seek and to enjoy asylum. That wording was incIuded instead in the Universal
Dec1aration of Human Rights (Ar.14(1)), which as a declaration has much less
force than a legally binding convention. In positive international law, therefore, the
right to asylum appears as a state's right to give - not an individual's right to
seek.
Recognizing the lacunae, international lawyers and organizations such as the
Camegie Endowment for International Peace drafted conventions that specifically
dealt with asylum as it affected the rights and duties of both states and individuals.
In 1977, a UN Conference on Terrtorial Asylum assembled in Geneva but did not
adopt a final document. Since then, the matter "was allowed to rest" (EIPL, 1985,
p.45, Grahl-Madsen, 1980). Several nations have statutory provisions on the right
of asylum in municipal laws; some also have constitutional provisions - most
notably Germany's Art. 16 which guarantees asylum for the politically persecuted
- but internationallaw remains inconclusive.
It is inconclusive rather than entirely closed because the 1951 Convention has a
provision relating to asylum in Ar.33. This prohibits refoulement, Le. the return
of refugees to an area where their lives or freedom would be endangered. Since
an individual who is denied access to seek asylum might in fact risk persecution,
the failure to con sider his application may have the same result as refoulement.
Art. 33 is, however, only an "embryonic provision" for an individual's right to
seek asylum (EPIL, 1985, p.48). The situation opens for great legal battles, which
is precisely what is occurrng as asylum is becoming increasingly restrcted in
Europe and North America. Asylum advocates contend that in order to pre vent a
possible refoulement, a state is obligated to give the individual a chance to apply
for asylum to make his case in the first place. Advocates of reluctant states argue
that provisions relating to the form of exclusioncannot constitute a basis for
admission, insofar as a person must be admitted in order to be exc1uded; (see e.g.
the Haitian Refugee Center v. James Baker ILL, Secretary of State).
2 A simila logic is use in the philosophy of human rights to distinguish between basic and
seconda rights, see Shue, 1980.
3 As amended by the 1967 Protocol. Until then, the Convention only applied to persons who were
refugees as a result of events in Europe prior to 1951.
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1.1.2 Definition: The other legal battleground over protection concerns the
definition of refugee. Two types of asylum mechanisms were delineated by
European law and practice by the end of World War IL. One was protection of
individual exiles, mostly embodied in positive nationallaw though prohibitions
on extradition. The other was protection of mas ses of people fleeing from war, as
first developed in international practice in connection with the League of Nations
aid to 800,00 Russian refugees after the 1917 revolution. Of these two
possibilties, the 1951 Convention centered on the individual exile, although the
subject was defined in general sociological categories rather than referenced to
paricular nationalities (as the League had done).
As formulated, the Convention categories reflected the classic refugee movements
in European history as well as the evolving Cold War. The political activist was
captured by the term persecution due to "political opinion". Members of a targeted
minority group were defined by largely ascriptive criteria of belonging to social
communities ("race, religion, nationality...and social group"). When the original
time and space limitations on the Convention were removed in 1967, only one
sociological type of refugee was not formally covered - the victim of generalized
violence such as war or social upheavals.
While in some respects liberal compared to the League instrments, the
Convention was c1early designed to circumscribe the obligations of states and limit
the number of persons who, under a universal definition ofrefugee, could press
their claims. The definitional emphasis on persecution served this purpose by
postulating a targeted and discriminatory treatment of individuals; that is, the
presumably exceptional case. Moreover, the Convention was customarly taken to
require individual screening of eligibilty and thereby prevent mass inflows.
During the 1980s, the definitional question centered on the distinction between
economic and political refugee. Facing mass inflows from poor countres,
industralized states c1aimed these were mere "economic refugees" and hence
excludable. The label - lie the dichotomy it reflected - was controversial.
More correctly, the distinction between economic and political reasons for
movement should be seen as a spectrm with pure types only at the extreme (e.g.
migrant worker and political dissident). In situations likely to produce mass
outflows, economic deprivations typically exist alongside political oppression and
civil violence. This is not a new phenomenon,4 yet it is likely to be increasingly
common in the contemporary world. In regions where demographic and
4 As we have argued e1sewhere. the exodus produced by the Irish potato famine in the 1840s was
fundaentally related to the ownership of land, in itself a result of political oppression. Would
this make the Irish economic or politica1 refugees? (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo, 1989, p. 32).
Pronouncing on a similar case in 1980, an American judge concluded that the Haitians were
political refugees because their economic plight was a result of systemic political oppression
(Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti).
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environmental pressures sharly reduce the limits for survival, political upheavals
may cause trly massive outflows. In these situations, the search for one basic
cause of flght - be it economic, political or environmental - is analytically
meaningless.
Some minimal definitional requirements can nevertheless be identified (Shacknove,
1985, Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo, 1989). Receiving states must apply some
consistency in standards, and con sider the need for protection as well as the cause
of flght. The definitional framework, in turn, must permt a distinction between
individual plight (such as persecution), and mass outflows caused by composite
economic and political deprivations accompanied by widespread violence - in the
extreme, war.
This was indeed the view of many critics who in the 1980s argued that the 1951
Convention was too narow to protect mas ses of people displaced in the
developing world. In the 1990s, the Convention was also seen as increasingly
irelevant to the refugee crisis confronting Europe in the Balans.
1.1.3 State rights vs. human rights: A more fundamental challenge to the
Convention appeared. Like refugee law generally, the Convention was basically
state-centrc in that it was framed in terms of the rights and duties of states rather
than individuals.s The political controversies that had shaped the drafting of the
Convention and the establishment of the post-war refugee regime were state-
centrc as well. Questions of definition, asylum and repatration appeared as points
of conflct between socialist states and democratic states, as yet another dividing
line between the East and the West in the deepening cold war (Holborn, 1975).
The Soviet Union consistently fought the development of a refugee regime it
feared would be used against it. Western states gave their support partly in that
spirit. Only with the demise of the Cold War did the underlying conflct between
individual rights and state rights rise to the surface in matters of asylum and
refugee status. A new debate emerged, anchored on one side to human rights law
and political concepts of "right of membership", on the other to conventional
rights of states (Adelman, 1988, Gibney, 1989, Wamer and Hathaway, 1992).
The arguments followed the classic philosophie divide between communitarians
and universalists. Communities have rights because individuals do not have a
social existence, nor, perhaps, moral character, apar from a community (Waltzer,
1983, Sandel,1984, Miler, 1988). Nation-state communities have a capacity for
rational and democratic self-rule and possess a system of distrbutive justice for
its members. From this flows their right to protect members vis-a-vis outsiders. In
legal terms, the argument parallels the notion of absorptive capacity as a limitation
5 The Preamble does, however, refer to the Universal Dec1aration of Human Rights and affirs
the fundaental rights of individuals.
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on asylum, an old concept in internationallaw that can be traced back to Emerich
de Vattel' s work in the mid-1700s.
The universalist answer is, in brief, that rights inhere in individuals, not in states.
States are seen as "agents", merely exercising rights on behalf of individuals in
their care, much like a life saver on the beach has been commissioned, on behalf
of all bathers, to save the drowning (Goo 1985). Since the right of the state is
derivative from the right of the individual, the plight of the needy must take
precedence over the (deri ved) right of the state. Given an international system that
is explicitly ordered on the premise of mutually exc1uding sovereignties, all
individuals must "belong", in the sense of being "assigned" to a state. Those who
fall or ar pushed out - the de facto or de jure stateless - consequently have a
right to be "assigned" to other states (van Gusteren,1988).
The solution to the c1assic conflct is collective, sometimes called assigned,
responsibilty (Shue, 1988, Gooin, 1988). Its equivalent for refugees is an
international refugee regime with common norms for admission, support and
burden-sharng. One parcular right (e.g of the individual to asylum), need not be
matched by one particular duty (e.g. of the neighbouring state to provide asylum).
The important thing is that the totals add up - that all asylum seekers have
reasonable access to protection somewhere, and that all states are "assessed" in
some reasonable relation to their resources and absorptive capacity. As Hathaway
argues, a solution requires that rights on both sides are recognized (Hathaway
1991).
For much of the industralized world, this was the essence of the asylum challenge
as it emerged in the late 1980s. With new and large populations on the move, the
North - soon to be the recognized winning coalition of the Cold War - had the
opportunity to forge new mechanisms of international cooperation so as to adjust
the balance of rights in matters of asylum.
1.2 Post-war flows
For several decades, the Convention served Europe' s refugees well. It was the
legal backbone of a liberal asylum regime that was buttressed by financial
resources and re settlement quotas offered by the United States, Canada and, soon,
a recovering Western Europe. In retrospect it is evident that the refugee regime
rested on the ideological foundation of the Cold War. Giving asylum to people
fleeing the Eastern bloc was a moral imperative and a political instrument in the
strggle against Communistn. That the refugees were Europeans and readily
absorbed in Europe's post-war economic boom was also important.
Strct exit controls in the East gave those who came out an "exceptional"
character. Vet, the numbers absorbed durig the height of the Cold War were trly
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massive - a point wort recalling in view of later restrctions. About 200,00
Hungarans fled when the 1956 uprising was crushed; 80,00 Czechoslovakians
escaped after the suppression in 1968; 30,00 Jews were effectively expelled from
Gomulka's Poland, and 3.5 milion Germans moved to the Federal Republie before
the Berlin Waii closed the loophole in 1961. In addition, a steady stream of
assorted nationalities went West, estimated to 10,00 annually in the early 1960s
(Mars, 1985). They were all welcomed. Ethnic Germans were accepted as
citizens under West German law. No attempt was mad to determne individual
eligibilty durng mass inflows fOiiowing political upheavals. Growing doubt
whether everyone from the Easternbloc were political refugees in the Convention
sense, or primarly economic refugees, merely produced adnistrative adjustments
to accommodate them under other c ategories. 6 European colonial powers also
absorbed ex-patrates and, sometimes, their supportrs who were pressed out by
the wars of independence in Africa.
Outside Europe, the picture was mixed' A large and intractable refugee problems
existed in the Middle East, although the central problem for the Palestinians was
not to secure asylum but to recover a state. In Asia, some flows were accepted for
political and humanitaran reasons independent of legal conventions;7 other
consisted of minorities with a homeland to which they could return (e.g. after the
parition of India in 1947). Here, the refugee issue concerned not asylum but
material assistance.
The now largely forgotten fate of the refugees from revolution in China, however,
is a classic case of restrcted asylum. Already in 1950, they were packed so tightly
into the hil-sides of Hong Kong that the British authorities dec1ared most new
arvals to be ilegal immigrants, subject to immediate expulsion. The simple but
effective policy of definitional exclusion was intermittently followed in subsequent
years (Bonavia 1983). Other states did the same, perhaps most glarngly by the
United States towards the Salvadoreans and the Haitians.
The distant case of the Chinese asylum seekers suggests the enduring frailty of
asylum in its contemporary form. The Chinese fled a combination of political
repression and economic poverty (combined with famine during the Great Leap
Forward in the late 1950s); they had a weak claim to external patron age based on
political grounds (Britain had recognized and sought to improve relations with the
6 Scandinavia led the way with the formal introduetion of a B-status for de facto or quasi-
refugees, or permission to stay on humanitaan grounds. It was first suggested by an innovative
Danish official who found that a group of Polish asylum sekers were not "persecuted" . yet
realized it was politically impossible to send them back across the "Iron Curtin" (Melander,
1979).
7 For instace, India - not a signatory to the 1951 Convention - readily accepted thousands
of Tibeta refugees in 1959.
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mainland regime); they had no other ethnic homeland (at least not large enough
to take them); they were poor, and they were very numerous. The case for asylum
had to rest primarlyon humanitaran grounds. In the event, that proved
insuffcient.
2. Crisis and expansion
In Latin America and Afrca, regional mechanisms combined with innovative
UNHCR practice to meet the asylum challenge with reasonable adequacy for
several years. When crisis arose, the res ult was an expansion of the formal
institutions of protection. Observers have tended to mythologize this response,
citing the "traditional African hospitality" and "the traditional inter-American"
system of asylum as explanatory factors for the expansionar process. Other
conditions, however, seem more relevant.
2.1 Latin America
The traditional inter-American system of asylum was indeedhighly developed in
law and practice. Yet, the conditions for obtaining asylum were narowly
circumscribed by regional instrments requiring evidence of political persecution,
rather than the presumably more generous standard of "well-founded fear" in the
UN Convention (Arboleda 1991, Yundt 1989). Asylum was defined as the right
of states to grant without incurrng hostilties from other states - not as the
individual's right to protection - and there were no prohibitions on rejection at
the frontier. Fearng additional obligations, several Latin states hesitated to
formally enter the UN refugee regime. By the end of the 1980s, six Latin
American countres had not ratified the UN Convention at all, and four states stil
retained its original geographic limitations.
The traditional Latin asylum system functioned reasonably well because the case
load was small, the asilados were mostly financiaUy secure members of the elite,
and govemments recognized that they all were politically vulnerable and one day
might need asylum. But also quite large flows were accommodated. MexIco -
of ten cited as a traditional liberal asylum countr - took in about 40,000 refugees
from the Spanish Civil War, and in common with other Latin states was a
generous host to thousands of vIctims from repressive states in South America
during the 1970s. The decisive change came with the mass exodus in Central
America in the 1980s. A qualitatively different magnitude appeared as revolutions
and civil war engulfed Central America in the 19808 (Gros Espiel, 1981, OAS
1983, Aguayo, 1985). In Mexico alone, an estimated 120,00 Salvadoreans sought
refugee, as well as tens of thousands of Guatemalans and some Nicaraguans.
Other conditions had also changed. These refugees were largely ordinar peasants
and workers, and the entire refugee question became as deeply poliicized as the
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conflcts from which people fled. The United States - which for political reasons
had taken in over half a milion Cubans who chose to leave the Castro~regime
between 1959 and 1979 - refused to accept more than a select few from Central
America's civil wars. The immediate burden fell on local institutions of asylum
which as aresult functioned poorly, leadng to repeated deportations and insecurty
even for those allowed in.
To prevent full collapse, the UNHCR worked with liberal social forces to adjust
legal norm in the adjoining Latin states. The initiatives - staring with the 1981
Colloquium in Mexico and supported by the Inter-American Commssion on
Human Rights - culminated in the 1984 Caragena Declaration. Promoted by
experts and representatives from ten states in the Central American region, the
declaration widened the definition of refugee to ensure that all victims of
generalized violence could claim protection. The Caragenacriteria included flght
from generalized violence, foreign aggression, international conflcts, massive
violations of human rights, or circumstances seriously disturbing public order, thus
going beyond comparable African norms.
The Declaration lacked the status of a treaty, and offcial wilingness to provide
liberal asylum was not always commensurate. Mexican authorities, for instance,
deported or rejected hundreds of Guatemalan refugees for basically political
reasons at the very moment when the Colloquium met in the Mexican capital
(Wollny, 1991).
The prOCess is of special interest in view of the restrctive European response to
its civil war in Yugoslavia ten years later. At a distance from the conflct, the
United States formally adopted a restrctive policy, but many came anyway and
were eventually absorbed de facto. Cio ser to the war itself, the situational dilemma
was sharer: states had to respond somehow to the presence of tens of thousands
of war victims who lacked alternative areas of protection. The ultima ratio of
humanitaranism was revealed as protection versus mass chaos and death. In this
balance, protection weighed heavily even though the paricipating states disagreed
sharlyon the nature of Central America's wars and feard that mass inflows
would adversely affect both their labor market and political c1imate.
With the demise of the Cold War, the socalled "regional conflcts", including the
Central American wars, moved towards settlement, and general repatration of
refugees commenced. Except for Haiti, no new mass outflows were in the offing.
For the first time in more than two decades, refugees were no longer a major
problem in the Americas. if and when that changes, the formal Latin American
system clearly stands strengthened to meet the eventuality of both individual
applications and mass asylum.
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2.2 Africa
Africa's first modern refugee crisis arose in the 1960s when wars of national
liberation displaced tens of thousands of people. As in Latin America in the 1980s,
the result was a strengthening of the formal support system for refugees. The
UNHCR steadily expanded its mandate to protect and aid displaced persons under
a "goo offices doctrne", which made it unnecessar to determne whether or not
the beneficiares were refugees in the Convention sense. The adoption of a legal
framework to assist mass outflows in itself was promoted by the many newly
independent states in the UN. Simultaneously, the Organiiation of African Unit y
(OAU) formalized a liberal convention governing asylum and refugees in the
region.
The 1969 OAU code reflected the political realities of the continent at the time,
just as the 1951 UN Convention had reflected post-war European concerns. The
OAU convention was formulated after a decade of increasingly violent strggles
for liberation in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Afrca and Rhodesia. For Africa's
independent states, these were unquestionable just wars, hence the derivative need
to extend maximum support to the victimized populations (Oloka-Onyango 1991,
Arboleda 1991). Art.2 stresses the right of asylum, and Art. 5 prohibits rejection
at the frontier - neither have counterpars in the UN Convention. The access to
seek asylum, then, is more strongly grounded, and once inside, the presumptive
beneficiar enjoys a broad definition of eligibilty for refugee status. In addition
to "persecution", refugees from generalized violence due to "external aggression",
"occupation" and "foreign domination" qualify as well.
The broad OAU definition was eminently suitable for a war situation that
produced mass outflows of people necessitating collective determination of
eligibilty. Moreover, it was the only realistic determnation procedure at the time,
given the ¡¡absence of decision-making infrastrcture" in receiving states (Arboleda
1991:195).
Two decades later, the strking characteristic of the African asylum regime
remained its liberal, formal-legal dimension. The law was probably as generous
as a state-centrc refugee system could be expected to be, drawing continuous
strength from its original legitimizing ideology of anti-colonialism and anti-racism.
In practice, moreover, easy asylum conditions of ten prevailed. Cross-border ethnic
ties faciltated hospitality, and the much-discussed weakness of African state made
it difficult to impose rigorous border controIs. In these situations, de facto asylum
could be c1aimed by default.
Since the early 1960s, Africa has probably had the largest share of the world's
refugees on a continuous basis. Africa also has highly developed migration
systems (RusselI, Jacobsen and Stanley 1990), but these flows are mostly and self-
evidently quite different. Claims for refugee assistance typically come from mass
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displacements of obviously miserable, often siaing people who flee from evident
disasters, and they are clearly in need of immediate relief. As a res ult, there is
liule sense that the asylum system is being abused by individuals making false
claims (African Group in Geneva, 1990). Arguably, this also constitutes the moral
pilar of the system: an elementar sense of justice -as sociologist Barngton
Moore (1978) has traced it through the ages and across continents - upholds the
strong declaratory commitment to asylum in contemporar Africa, and, to the
extent it is observed, underpins its translation into practice.
As in the traditional inter-American system of asylum, symmetr in vulnerabilty
strengthens the institution. Afrcan states are typically both sending and receiving
countres for refugees. If mass displacements are likely to occur in all populations
and states at one time or another, a strong asylum institution is self-evidently a
common goo.
On the other hand, its is c1ear that practice has differed. As victims of anti-
colonial struggles were followed by victims from abuse, civil wars or ethnic
violence in independent African states, both rejection at the border and mass
expulsions occurred (Oloka-Onyango, 1991, Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo, 1989, pp.
49-66). Once inside, refugees were subjected to abuse that rendered asylum as a
place of protection meaningless.8 In these cases, formal asylum was little better
than rejection at the frontier. Moreover, asylum has been endangered by policies
of neighbouring states which attack the refugees, the host countr or both.
African critics argue that the "traditional, much-touted generosity of Afrcan states
to refugees cannot be the fundamental basis of real and guaranteed security for the
refugee" (Oloka-Onyango 1991:460). Recent efforts have been made to strengthen
the legal framework by making the non-refoulement provisions more rigid (the
1981 Banjul Charer). More fundamentally, it is recognized that the weakness of
the African refugee system reflects the very heavy burden imposed on poor states.
Durng the 1980s, the number ofUNHCR-registered refugees in Africa fluctuated
around 3-4 milion, rising to 5 milion at the end of the decade (U.S. Deparment
of State, 1990). As for future projections, there are no signs of strctural change
in the economic, demographic or political sphere that suggest immediate or
marked reductions in Afrca' s refugee population.
As aresult, concern is focused on ways to secure external assistance, including the
establishment of a large special fund, as discussed at the 1984 International
Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA Il). Equally important,
8 For instace, in the Southern Suda, Haell-Bond found numerous cases of confiscation of
property, discriinatory treaUTent by cours, false and prolonged imprisonment, beting, serious
wounding, torture, assault, forced labour, kidnap, rape and morder being perpetrated against the
refugees (Harell-Bond, 1986, 1992).
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and increasingly recognized, is the formulation of appropriate aid strategies for the
refugee population.
3. Crisis and restriction
By the late 1970s, the international refugee regime had suffered periodic crises,
but these had generally served to widen asylum, as evidenced by the 1967
Protocol, the OAUconvention, the UNHCR "goo offces" doctre, and the
Caragena dec1aration. During the 1980s, however, a series of crises had the
opposite effect. Numerous restrctions and an entie new vocabular -
"interdiction", "humane deterrnce" iicarer sanctions", iieconomic refugees" -
were introduced to justify limitations on asylum.
The restrctions applied mainly to spontaneous asylum flows from South to North.
European states established an elaborate international network to reduce the
number of asylum seekers. In North America, U.S. authorities sought to keep out
large refugee flows from Central America and the Carbbean. Canadian authorities
followed the trnd in 1992 by preparng amendments to the immigration law that
would restrct access to seek asylum.
Large refugee flows in themselves do not necessarily cause restrctions. Five
millon Afghans, for instance, found ready asylum in neighbouring Pakstan and
Iran during the 1980s. In numerical terms, the inflow of asylum seekers that led
Western Europe to institute shar restrctions amounted to thousands, at most tens
of thousands, per host state. The flow was small compared to regular migration
movements (see Table 5), and even more insignificant if estimates of ilegal
migration are inc1uded. Subsequently, the flow did increase markedly, especially
in Germany which in 1992 expected half a milion asylum seekers. The restrctive
response, however, was evident aleady by the mid-1980s. Similarly, Haitians
seeking asylum in the United States caused a re action quite out of proportion to
their numbers: Haitian iiboat-people" counted a mere 12,400 persons in 1980,
15,000 in early 1992, and virtually nobody in the intervening years. By
comparson, the legal ceilng on immigrants to the U.S. was 534,00, and was
furter increased to more than 700,000 annually in the 1990 Immigration Act
(Papademetrou, 1991).
The examples ilustrate a more general point: Refugee movements may be small
in numbers but high in emotive content because presumptive refugees have claims
on receiving states that migrants do not. Under internationallaw, sovereign states
must at least give potential refugees a hearng and under certain conditions admit
entr; in democratic societies, pressures to do so can be significant. In principle,
admission is based on solelyon humanitaran considerations, regardless of social
or economic interests. While refugees clearly bring with them skils and other
contrbutions, they are in a fundamental sense selected by forces outside, and
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independent of, the receiving society. Spontaneous asylum seekers who arve in
groups or successive waves appear as paricularly troublesome cha1lenges to state
control.
There are exceptions, as the generous Western response to East-West flows durng
the Cold War period indicate. But since these flows came from a hostile alliance
of states, accommodation had a political value that strengthened the humanitaran
impulse. By comparson, the inflows that produced progrssive restrctions on
asylum in Western Europeand North America durng the 1980s had little political
use-value. These flows were large compared to previous movements (see Fig 1),
they consisted of spontaneous asylum seekers rather than quota refugees who were
resettled through the UNHCR in a controlled manner, and they were preceded by
a general crisis in the international refugee regime with the sudden appearance,
around 1979-80, of millons of new refugees from Indochina, Afghanistan, and the
Horn of Africa. Moreover, many were from developing countres, and many were
widely suspected, or officially denoted, as not bein 
g Hgenuine" refugees. The last
two points served to conjure up visions of millons more to come. In a sense, the
industralized North introduced asylum restrctions as a defense against a populous
and turbulent South.
But the issue was more complicated. The earliest and sharest restrctions of the
decade appeared not in Europe, but in Southeast Asia, where authorities limited
asylum for Indochinese. Ten years later, the collapse of Soviet socialism and an
end to exit controls in the former Warsaw Pact countres made Western states
adjust their refugee policies to the post-cold war era. The result was restrctions
on East-West flows similar to those applied to non-Europeans. Clearly, the asylum
issue was not simply a facet of the North-South conflct. An underlying concern
was fear that the asylum institution was bein g misused and had become a vehicle
for disguised migration. This was an important factor behind the restrctions in
Asia (Suhrke, 1983, McNamara, 1989), as well as in Europe.
3.1 North America
Since the adoption of the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. refugee policy has been marked
by a shar dualism: the legal framework is relatively liberal, but practice has been
highly politicized and restrctive towards unwanted groups (Loescher, 1986,
Zucker & Zucker, 1987).
The ideological bi as in policy implementation has been well documented. While
the 1980 Act incorporated the universal definition of refugee of the 1951 UN
Convention, about 95 per cent of the refugees admitted to the United states in the
1980-88 period came from communist countres. In asylum cases, the differential
treatment of Cubans (generally admtted) and Haitians (generally rejected) bore no
obvious relationship to their respective degree of "persecution"; the same applied
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to differential tratment of other nationalities (Helsin Watch, 1989). While socio-
economic and racial factors sometimes, but not always, formed a pattem,9 the
political tendencies were extraordinarly clear: Applicants from states supported
by the United States were decIar to be economic refugees even though they had
a prima facie claim to protection (Salvadoreans fleeing from civil war during the
1980s, and Guatemalan Indians escaping a brutal suppression in the early 1980s).
Persons fleeing from communist or leftist governments in the region were
generally accepted as refugees (Nicaraguans durng Sandinista rule) or paroled in
on special terms (Cubans).
By far the L arge st proportion of refugees enterig the Unite States under varous
categories since World War Il had come under controlled conditions through
organized resettlement, or had initiated applications in American missions abroad.
The vast hinterland of spontaneous asylum seekers lay South of the Rio Grande,
above all in the populous Central American and Carbbean region. When conflct
erupted here, population flows were essentially beyond U.S. control. Despite
strnuous efforts, North America could not insulate itself against the refugee
consequences of social conflct in its vicinity. The porousness of the Southem land
border was legendar; only "boat-people" from small island states could be
interdicted with some ease.
Thus, geography and politics of ten worked in opposite direction during the 1980s.
U.S. policy consistently excluded Salvadoreans as "economic refugees", yet
perhaps half a milion succeeded in entering the countr anyway. Most stayed as
ilegal migrants until opportunities for regularzation appeared. For the local states,
the U.S. route represented a significant ease of the total refugee burde n from
Central America's wars. Stil, the system imposed great hardship and uncertainty
on the individual refugee and generated significant tension between the U.S. and
the Latin states, above all Mexico.
Faced with civil war and mass outflows, a formal system of temporar protection
and collective determnation of eligibilty would have be en an appropriate
response. This was suggested by experts at the time (Harman, 1988, Gallagher,
Marn and Weiss-Fagen, 1989), and the U.S. had already a unilateral practice of
this kind. The Extended Voluntar Deparure (EVD) status was explicitly
temporar and collectively bestowed on individuals from eligible countres.
Eligibilty criteria centered on generalized violence, as distinct from the more
discriminatory and narrow criterion of "perseeution". Customarly given to persons
already in the U.S. when hostilities erupted, EVD was granted to Ethiopians,
9 For instance, Haitin "boat-peple" were both por and black, while the first fIows from Cuba
were of European ongin and middle-class. However, the fIotila of some 120,00 Cubans who
sailed to Florida in 1980 included many of working class and pnmanly non-European ongin.
The Maelitos, as they were called, were stil admitted.
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Nicaraguans (1979-80), later to the Chinese (durng the 1989 democratic rising)
and Bosnians (1992).
Due to concerted political pressure, an equivalent status was eventually granted the
Salvadoreans. But the U.S. position and, more generally, the intense politicization
of the Central American refugee question made it impossible to develop a
common, regional system of temporar protection. Optimally, such a system would
stramline criteria and the conditions for protection, and establish rules for burden
sharg in the region. Divided over whom to give protection, and faced with U.S.
opposition to any form of common regime, the smaUer and poorer states of the
region did not go beyond the declaratory innovations at Caragena. The U.S. did
not support even that.
Until1990, the U.S. granted temporar stay through administrative discretion. To
reduce the potential for parisan application, critics obtained a legislative basis for
temporar protection status (TPS) in an amendment to the Immigration Act of
1990 (Helton, 1990). By legislative action, TPS could be collectively bestowed on
nationals of paricular states. This helped to solve the immediate problems for the
Salvadoreans, who were given TPS, but considerable administrative discretion and
associated problems stil remained.
The larger question concerned retum once the conflct subsided. io Since migration
and refugee movements overlapped, repatration would be problematic. It might
be encouraged by aid to reconstrction and development. Failng that, permanent
absorbtion in the U.S. could be viewed as the inevitable outcome of geography
and history - the consequence of being a rich state with poor neighbours. Yet,
return was at least a necessar political fiction to ensure that temporary protection
would be granted in the first place. By 1992, the outcome of the first big test case
in North America was uncertain. The U.S. had agreed to postpone repatration of
Salvadoreans pending implementation of the December 1991 peace agreement and
furer economic reconstrction.
The controversial case of the Haitian "boat people" also raised fundamental
questions of access to asylum and eventual return. Because Haitians fled
conditions of mixed deprivations - systemic poverty and a ruthless regime -
asylum c1aimsunder prevailng legal norms and democratic conditionsinvited long
and costly cour battles. Deciding to cut the process short, the U.S. government
insttcted the Coast Guard in 1981 to interdict and re turn Haitians after cursory
hearingsat the high seas. As critics noted, it was c1early a case of restrcting
access to seek asylum, similar to efforts under way in Europe (see below). The
definition of eligibilty was narowly interpreted - of more than 12,00 Haitians
10 I indebted to discussion on this point with Susan Forbes Man of the Refugee Policy Group
and Doris Meissner, The Caregie Endowment, both of Washington D.C.
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interdicted between 1981 and 1987, only 2 were granted political asylum (USCR,
1987).
The Haitian case generated intense legal and political battles.By some standards,
it was a clear case of discrimination (e.g. relative to the admission of Cubans). By
other standards, the complexity of the case defied easy answers - access to
asylum versus misuse of the institution, economic versus political refugees, and
consistency of proess versus the inflation in admssions if the Cuban standard
were applied to all. Ironically, the situation became much clearer when conditions
in Haiti worsened. The 1991 coup led to widespread violence, acute deprivation
and new outflows.
The optimal response suggested itself: temporar protection pending the outcome
of diplomatic efforts to restore a degree of political normalcy, or the political
status quo ante (Meissner 1992). In other words, the situation called for a
procedure similar to other situations of mass outflow from violent social
upheavals. The D.S. Administration, however, stared with the most ambitious
process (regular asylum procedures), only to move rapidly to the other extreme
(deportation and interdiction).
Given the prominent D.S. position in the international refugee regime, interdiction
of Haitian boats created fears that this would legitimize similar measures
elsewhere, notably in Southeast Asia. It wil be recalled, however, that massive
denials of access in Southeast Asia actually started about two years earlier.
Considerations other than U.S. practice shaped asylum policy in Southeast Asia
(Sutter 1990), and D.S. had at any rate undermined any cIaim to moral leadership
in asylum and refugee matters given its transparently partisan policy. As for
Europe, paralleI developments were underway for unrelated reasons.
3.2 Europe11
After a bulge in the early 1980s, Western Europe experienced a sustained and
rapid increase in asylum seekers that was unprecedented. From a low of 50,000
in 1983, the figure rose to over 400,000 in 1991 (see Fig. 2). A refugee system
that traditionally had functioned to meet crisis events (wars, suppressions,
pogroms, revolutions) - and which was premised on the notion that states
extended special obligations to refugees because, unlike migrants, they constitute
exceptional cases - was now confronted with a continuous phenomenon.
At the outset, the flows seemed problematic. No longer a labor importing region,
Western Europe did not welcome the new arvals on economic grounds. The
Il This section was written with the assistanee of Finn K vaae, Faculty of Law, University of
Bergen.
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"foreign" (non-European) origins of many created an impact that was readily
exploited by political fringe movements, especially as unemployment mounted.
There was also legitimate concern that the asylum queue concealed a large number
of migrants. After 1973.74, asylum had represented the only legal entr gate to
Eurpe for persons who lacked the requisite skilIs or famly ties to qualify for
regular migration, which at any rate was quite limited. Numerous asylum seekers
in the mid~1980s came from countres that until recently had provided Western
Europe with guestworkers (notably Turkey and Yugoslavia), and an evident chain-
migration operated from select Afrcan countres (Zai and Ghana) (see Table
3).12
Yet, here were also nationals from countres with civil strfe, war or violent
minority~majority conflcts (e.g. Iranians, Lebanese and Tamils). ff anything at all
was clear, it was that the flow was mied. This was reflected in the outcome of
the screening.13 In 1987-88 the acceptance rate was about 40 per cent, or
substantially above the American rate during most of the 1980s (Widgren, 1990b).
The mixed universe of applications required an elaborate screening mechanism.
Despite efforts to shorten and streamline the proeess, a complicated case could go
on for 2-3 years before all avenues were exhausted. As public debate over asylum
issues became increasingly acrimonious, so did the legal and political battles, and
the costs mounted.14
For a large and prosperous Europe, the financial costs - like the numbers of
asylum seekers themselves - were hardly overwhelming. Behind the figures lay
a deeper fear ofuncontrolled immigration coming through the asylum gate (Rogers
1991, Joly 192). The concern was heightened towards the end of the decade.
The disintegration of the Soviet empire meant increased turbulence and an end to
exit controIs. From less than 50,00 in 1987, the inflow of asylum seekers from
the erstwhile East grew to almost 250,000 in 1991 (see Table 4). The main
sending countres were Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgara (not
12 Of course, refugees as customarly defined may also chain-migrate, as Blaschke has observed
with respet to Turkish Kurds (Blaschke, 1989).
13 Categories of acceptace included Convention status (prsons who could establish a "well-
founded fear" ofpersecution) and other persons in nee of protetion. For the latter group, same
states had explicitly temporar permits for stay (e.g. the Exceptional Leave to Remain issued
in the United Kingdom). Scandinavian countres gave residenee perm it on humanitaian
grounds. The terms of stay were almost equivalent to Convention status.14 Accordig to an intergovemmenta study that tred to put a dollar figure on direct costs
(administrative, legal and social aid etc.), the bil for 13 West Europen states increase from
around 500 milion dollars in 1983 to around 7 bilion dollars in 1991 (IC,1992). By
comparson, the foreign aid (ODA) of one major European state, (West) Germany, was almost
5 bilion dollars in 1989.
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counting about 300,00 Bulgaran Turks who went to Turkey). The sudden
onslaught came on top of long-term, strctural pressurs from the South, where
a rapidly grwing population was being brought steadilycloser to Europe through
advanced communication and social networks.
As the decade of the 1990s opened, the implication of the definitional question -
who is a refugee? - had been radcally altered. Given that economic deprivations
and politically oriented violence co~existed in large pars of the world, a broad
interpretation would open for huge inflows. Even areasonably strct interpretation
of the Convention would permt milions to press a valid claim for protection in
Eurpe. This included victims of oppressive or totaitaran regimes (who as a
category had been admitted from Eastern Europe during the Cold War), and
members of vulnerable minorities (who constituted the c1assical "target" group of
refugees in European history).
Ethnic minorities in conflct represented a paricularly problematic category
because they were both numerous and presumptive refugees under the 1951
Convention. In an earlier period of imperial disintegration and state formation in
Europe, a concentration-principle had been at work as ethnic diaspora moved to
their "homeland" (Annals, i 939). This seemed less likely to happen this time.
Even minorities with an alternative home countr might find that economic and
political opportunities outweighed ethnic affinity. For instance, Turkey and
Hungary generally followed the German practice of full Y accepting ethnic kin
(Aarbake, 1989, SOPEMI 1992). But the Bulgaran Turks also fanned out more
broadly to Germany and Sweden. The ethnic Albanians who left Yugoslavia's
Kosovo province by the thousands from the late 1980s and onwards went to
Western Europe, not "home" to Albania. Numerous minorities in the former Soviet
Union might respond similarly if under pressure. The prospect c1early chiled
Western Europe (Widgren 1990a).
Already by the mid-1980s, the growing asylum queue and the pace of European
unit y had put the issue on the agenda. The 1986 Single European Act, which
stipulated free movement of capital and labor within the European Community by
1993, precipitated a restrctive streamlining of the asylum process that led to the
Schengen and Dublin agreements - popularly known as the outer walls of
"Festung Europa". The documents defined the core of in policy with several
elements: access to seek asylum was restrcted, the criteria for eligibilty were
narowed, the determnation prOCess was shortened, and deportation of rejected
c1aimants was made more efficient.
Convention status became increasingly diffcult to obtain, likewise the wider
category for other victims of violence used by some states. By 1991, overall
acceptance rate was down to 25 per cent, with an average of 8 per cent for
Convention status and the rest non-Convention status (Widgren, 1992).
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Yet, the strategy to uphold a limited and formal criterion which extracted one
element (Le. political persecution) from an intrcate causality complex was
inherently vulnerable. The democratic and legal processes in Western Europe
opened for endless political battles and polarzed public debates, including
violence (Kaye 1992). Moreover, the asylum process appeared to be not only
costly but essentially futile. Although only 25 per cent might be formally accepted,
an estimated 80 per cent of all asylum seekers stayed anyway, as state authorities
yielded to technical and political obstacles of effecting return. 15
The only remaining avenue of control- if that remained the objective - was to
limit the access to seek asylum in the first place. Here was the second front in
Europe's asylum crisis. Already in the mid-1980s, individual states adopted what
in Southeast Asia had been called humane deterrence: inhospitable quarers,
reduced social benefits and limited work permits while the case was pending,
sanctions on carers that brought in passengers without documentation, and visa
requirements (Schneider, 1989, Kaye, 1992). The objective was to discouraged
presumptive "economic refugees" from clogging the asylum process. The problem
of "manifestly unfounded or abusive applications" was also tabled in the
UNHCR's Executive Committee (UNHCR, 1983), giving rise to the controversial
term "abusive asylum seeker".
The Schengen and Dublin agreements were formulated in the context of a process
designed tocontrol border crossings, inc1uding drug smuggling, terrorism and
ilegal migration. As a result, the asylum question acquired the dimension of
ilegality, appearng as a problem for the state rather than a need of the individual
(Joly 1992). The agreements sought to strengthen control of the common external
border by haronizing visa policies, carer sanctions, and - of great significance
- permt the asylum seeker to lodge only one application within the community
(Loscher, 1989, Plender, 1989).16 To prevent asylum seekers from moving -
or being compelled to move - from one European countr to another in search
of asylum, the Dublin convention gave the asylum seeker only one chance to
15 An inter-govemmenta study found that only 25,00 out of 110,000 rejectees in 1990 had
actually left the countr voluntaly or "with the diect assistaee of law enforcement
authorities" (IC, 1992, p.l l). The rest had melted away, probably working in the black economy
or applying for asylum in a neighbourigcountr.
16 A forerunner of the Dublin Convention, the Se hengen Agreement was developeddurng the
second half of the 1980s and signed by Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
in 1990, with Italy, Portgal and Spain joining the following yea and Greece being an
observer. The Dublin Convention was signed by all EC members in 1990 and is open for
association to non-EC European states.
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apply by placing the exclusive responsibilty for proessingand support on the
countr where the applicant first appeared.17
When the Cold War division of Europe disappeared, ex-Warsaw Pact states were
also incorporated into the common asylum regime. The intention was to control
East- West rngration in all its aspects. This include general attention to "root
causes", but more imediate plans for exchange of information about travel
routes, border controIs, visa requirements, carer control, and mechanisms for
retum of ilegal rngrnts. Organized as a system of conferences and continuous
consuItations known as the Vienna and Berlin processes (after rnnisterial meetings
in 1991), the scheme applied to East European nation als as well as trnsiting
travellers.
Since few asylum seekers are in a position to obtain proper documentation before
flght, most appear as ilegal immigrants until an asylum application is lodged.
Measur to control ilegal migration consequently affect access to asylum. In
addition, several East European countres (Pol and, Hungary and Czechoslovakia)
tightened their asylum policies in 1990-91. By a "strct adherence" to the 1951
Convention's concept ofpersecution, the number of asylum applications from both
the region and beyond was brought down (SOPEMI 1992)
In an extraordinar exercise of international consuItations, the European states also
brought Nort America and even Australia into the regime. Informal but
increasingly institutionalized deliberations proceeded through a separate forum
called the Informal Consultations, headquarered in Geneva.
AItogether, the restrctions delineated an international division of labor designed
to make it more diffcuIt for presumptive refugees to reach Europe's "civil spaee".
This applies both to persons from the former Eastern Europe and non-Europeans.
Once a process is initiated, it wil be streamlined and shortened. At present,
European asylum procedures vary greatly. Until they are unifed, as stipulated by
the 1991 Maastrcht Treaty, existing haronization policies wil favour the least
liberal leveL. The collective-action mechanisms of the Schengen and Dublin
agreements wil penalize the state with the most liberal asylum prOCess, as that
state wil end up with most claims. Recent moves in Germany to abolish the
Constitutional guarantee of political asylum are evidence of this mechanism.
17 This issue bad for many years prevented the Council of Europe from developing a regional
convention on asylum. The problem of asylum seekers who were sent from one airrt to
another in Europe as each countr wanted to offoad its problem proved the stumbling block.
The Nort Europe countries argued that the countr where the claimant first appeed should
have the primar responsibilty for proessing, the Southem European countres - which were
the principal points of entr for asylum seekers from the Middle East and Afrca - countered
that responsibilty should fall on the intended destination of the claimant (Kjærum and Horst,
1991).
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Moreover, the rule which permits only one application wil remove man y "degrees
of freedom" for asylum seekers who presently can fie claims in several countres.
The full impact of the Schengen\Dublin agreements - which are not yet ratified
by all paricipating states - remains to be seen. So far, even severe national
restrctions have had limited effect. Measures introduced by most Western
European states during the second half of the 1990s - inc1uding carer sanctions,
visa requirements, shortened processing and, in Germany a 1987 Act that
drastically reduced the social benefits - made no dent in the upward trend of
applications (see Fig 2; Danish Refugee Council, 1988, 1991). The authorities
admtted as much by looking for additional measurs. One widely discussed model
was the agreement conc1uded in 1991 between the Schengen signatories and
Pol and to return of persons with unfounded c1aims (Widgren, 1992). Several
governments also adopted the principle of "safe countr", denoting a state where
persecution did not exist and from which asylum applications by collective
determination were excluded. Similar "safe countr" principles also applied to the
return process.
It was a measure of the pressure on the asylum institution that these deeply
iliberal measures were widely accepted as necessary to save the institution itself.
As professor Hailbronner argued in a report from a legal experts committee
established by the Council of Europe: "The present system of asylum procedure
can be characterised as extrmely inefficient in terms of waste of resources, and
of very doubtful value for the protection for those whose need is greatest"
(Hailbronner, 1991, pA). For the same reason, Hailbronner commended the use of
"safe countr" profies to weed out bogus claims (e.g. mass c1aims from Eastern
European states in 1990-91 when the collapse of oppressive regimes made political
persecution less likely l but exit much easier). 18
Probably the main danger was that the access to seek asylum would be severely
restrcted. The point was made in the Council of Europe, the European Parliament
and by the UNHCR (Council of Europe, 1992). Carer sanctions were criticized,
and it was feared that the haronization policy would jeopardize individual rights
and due prOCess. Neither the Schengen nor the Dublin agreement made reference
to the European Convention on Human Rights, which implicitly recognizes the
right to seek asylum (Einarsen, 1990). As human rights law increasingly appeared
as a source of defense for refugees against restrctive states, failure to cite the pre-
eminent European instrment in this regarded was significant. In the balance
between states rights and individual rights, the Schengen\Dublin tendency was
unambiguous. A Council of Europe report conc1uded:
18 The practice of sending asylees back to countres deemed safe, however, was more doubtful-
a concem echoed in the Canadian debate (Adelman 1992).
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"The national administrtion of the Twelve (signatories) ... sems more concerned by
reducing, sharing and distrbuting the burden (of refugees) ... than by protecting the basic
rights of asylum-sekers and "de facto" refugees. The Europen Community move towards
a common asylum policy is of ten perceived as a sort of competition between the twelve
member states to intruce higher restrctions towards refugees in order to become less
attactive than others as a countr of asylum. Such a restrctive asylum policy reinforces the
idea that a "fortess" Europe is being built" (Council of Europe, 1992). The report was
penned by Sir John Hunt, Conservative, of the United Kingdom.
The policy opened for another kind of criticism by introducing standards of
eligibilty and access that previously had not been applied to refugees from
communism. Lack of consistency, critics could claim, reflected thinly guised
xenophobia and racism, and pandered to the extreme right.
The drving force in the attack on Europe's new asylum policy was a small but
vocal circle of NGOs, scholars and human rights activists organized on an all-
European basis (SIM, 1989, Amnesty International, Kjærum and Horst, 1991, Joly
and Cohen 1989, Nobel 1987). Taking human rights as their staring point, they
argued that the fundamental rights of asylum seekers were endangered.
Harmonization of asylum policies was both necessary and desirable, but the
process must aim to protect the asylum seekers, not serve the interests of states.
The European NGO for asylum seekers, ECRE, called in 1989 for a parallel
Schengen agreement to protect, assist and resettle asylum seekers (ECRE,1989).
The NGOs demanded a greater role in the asylum determination process, and
revived the idea for a convention on asylum as well as a broader definition of
refugee, equivalent to the OAU and Cartagena categories for victims of violence
(SIM, 1989). ff the result were an increase in Europe's asylum burden, so be it:
from the perspective of global burden-sharng and the existence of some 12-14
milion refugees worldwide, Europe should rightly accept more.19
The debate revealed the underlying agony in European attitudes towards refugees.
The contradiction between states rights and human rights was particularly shar
because asylum had come to mean permanent entr. Although national laws often
implied a temporar stay, return to the country of origin was rare. Moreover, the
control and selection that was possible when subscribing to UNHCR quotas of
resettlement refugees could not be exercised when asylum seekers presented
themselves on the border. Both points were demonstrated - if not resolved - by
the refugee crisis which accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
3.2.1 The Yugoslav crisis: In refugee terms, Yugoslavia became Europe's Central
America. The civil war in the early 1990s displaced people on the southern rim
19 Arguing that Western Europe's recognized refugee population in 1988 was only 0.17 per cent
of Europe's population, Joly and Cohen (1989) denounced the "semi-hysteria" displayed by
European govemments and media, and noted that affluent Europe's share of the world's refugee
population was indee minute.
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of Europe on a scale that the region had not experienced since World War Il. As
the European responses crystallize, a new ortodoxy foried: refugees should be
aided as close to the center of conflct as possible - preferably within their own
countr. Failng that, external asylum should be explicitly temporar (ECRE 1992,
UNHCR 1992, USCR 1992).
The severe limitation on asylum which this implied was underlined by frequent
imposition of visa requirements on nationals from the war-tom area. By mid-July
1992, just before aGeneva conference confired the response as an all-European
policy, Austra, Germany and Switzerland had effectively closed their borders to
new arvals from Bosnia Herzegovina, requirng visa and evidence of sustenance
before entr. As this choked off the flow to countres further North, the latter
generally did not require visa. The situation foreshadowed the vision of a united
Europe free from the victims of war as stringly specified by Art 100C, para 2
of the Maastrcht treaty: In an emergency outside the traty area, the member
states can impose visa restrctions in order to prevent mass inflows.
While seeking to keep out Yugoslav refugees, West European states generously
financed relief assistance for displaced persons within the area, mainly in Croatia
and Slovenia, as well as providing relief to besieged Sarajevo and other cities. In
addition, some countres took in smaller number of particularly vulnerable persons
in high ly controlled and symbolie humanitaran gestures.
The result was soon evident. Of slightly over 2 millon refugees from the former
Yugoslavia by mid-1992, about 1.7 millon remained in Bosnia Herzegovina or in
Croatia and Slovenia. By far the large st group of those who had made it to
Western Europe were Kosovo Albanians, many of whom had arved before the
civil war erupted (see Table 7).
From the outset, the UNHCR encouraged wider asylum by callng for temporar
protection until the war ended. The experience from Croatia was encouraging;
relative peace in early 1992 had enabled two-thirds of the 1.2 milion Croatian
refugees in neighbouring aras to return. Recognizing this, and the severity of the
humanitaran crisis, some European governments softened their practice. Nationals
of ex- Yugoslavia who managed to enter were rarely returned. Most were not
processed for formal asylum but given varous forms of temporar stay, sometimes
grounded in new administrative regulations (Italy and the Netherlands), at other
times simply resulting from a decision neither to prOCess nor to deport (Norway,
Belgium). States with a resident Yugoslav population originating from earlier
guestworkers readily issued family visitors visas.
The alternative to this patchwork of protection would have been an organized
system of temporar mass asylum throughout Western Europe with appropriate
mechanisms for collective eligibilty, burden sharing and return. The idea was
familar to legal experts (Grahl-Madsen, 1980, Melander, 1987, Einarsen, 1992)
22
and had surfaced during the Central American refugee crisis. A formal proposal
that contained all the elements of a collective, temporar regime was presented by
the Swedish government to the UNHCR alady in April 1992. The idea was
discussed at the high-Ievel Geneva conference called by UNHCR to deal with the
Yugoslav crisis in July 1992, was endorsed by support groups (ECRE 1992b), and
met with official interest in Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. Opposition from
France and the United Kingdom, however, blocked furer progrss. Given a
general reluctance to accept refugees, individual states could veto a collective
regime by refusing to tae "their" share.
Affluent states, it seems, react simlarly to the presenee of war refugees in their
immediate neighborhood- although for different reasons. The U.S. government
wished to deny the existence of refugees from El Salvador because they fled from
a client state. In Western Europe, political considerations should have favored the
refugees, yet European unhappiness with Serbian forces was insuffcient to give
asylum to their victims. The overrding European concern was fear that mass
inflows would be a burden, and that the attractions of EC's affluent, civil space
would make the presence permanent.
The UNHCR did not aggressively advocate a more Hberal European asylum
regime. Having always been dependent on voluntar contrbutions to finance its
activities, the UNHCR had developed an organizational code of cautious
diplomacy which showed also this time. The Balkan emergency necessitated
recurrg appeals for relief and supplies to prevent mass staration in the
embattled areas. It would have required strong leadership to press the
industralized states for additional asylum concessions, especially as any significant
off-Ioading from ex- Yugoslavia would have involved taking out thousands of
persons.
The question, then, must be addressed, did it matter? Was not the "Y ugoslav
solution" optimal on political as well as ethical grounds?
4. Internalization of asylum: A new trend
Policy towards asylum is integrally linked to what follows - settlement or return.
In Western practice and consciousness, the concept of asylum as a prelude to
settlement was firmly anchored. Return had not been a relevant alternative for
emigrés from the Russian revolution, Jews who fled Nazism, or Europeans who
escaped communism. The same principle was applied to the developing world for
Cubans and Indochinese who left communist regimes en masse.
As the 1990s opened, the industralized states were ready for a change.
Communism had collapsed and compassion for refugees was strained, as were the
capitalist economies. Fearng cumulative asylum demands from a populous and
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turbulent world, the Western dominant powers suggested a new agenda. More
attention should be given to prevent flows by dealing with root cause. Repatration
must be encouraged - 1992 was to be The Year of Repatration, as the High
Commssioner for Refugees said in 1991- and mass flows should be aided close
to home so as to encourage retur.
The new trends in the global refugee regime were evident durng the Yugoslav
crisis, and, before that, in the 1991 Gulf war. When the Kurds rebelled durng the
c10sing phase of the war and Turkey closed the border, the U.S.led coalition
established a zone for Kurdish refugees inside Iraq. Widely applauded as a model
of humanitaran intervention, the immediate effect of denying external asylum was
nevertheless widespread death and suffering as thousands of Kurdish refugees were
stranded in an inhospitable border area. Nor did the strategy address the critical
political question as to who in the long run would protect the zone. Intervention
clearly might beget further intervention, setting in motion a process that in the
absence of even a rudimentar international convention regulating humanitaran
interventions was problematic (Henkin et al.,1989, Childers, 1992). On a much
smaller scale, the UNHCR also sought to internalize aid and protection in Sri
Lanka by establishing Open Relief Centers for displaced persons within the
countr (Rodgers 1992).
Despite the obvious advantages of asylum based on the proximity principle,
serious concems remain. The most immediate question is whether asylum close
to the center of conflct actually wil assure protection. There are other problems.
Neighbourng areas may become overloaded, resulting in hardship for both
refugees and the local population, new conflcts, and eventually denial of asylum.
All tendencies were by late 1992 evident in Croatia. For states further away, the
proximity principle wil act as a sedative to relax their efforts to give assistance,
let alone addrssing the root causes of outflows (ILO\HCR, 1992). Finally,
because admitting refugees from the region has been a norm, not to do so is
sending a message of indifference that may actually worsen the plight of the
affected people, especially when the se are identifable communities targeted for
attack as in "ethnic cleansing" (Suhrke, 1992).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
As we have seen,pressure on contemporar asylum institutions differs
significantly across regions and countres. A basic reason is that asylum is granted
and, hence sought, with reference to essentially political conflcts. The structure
of political conflct, in tur, is highly varable and distinct from the more uniform
tendencies that OCcur throughout much of the world such as demographic
pressures, uneven economic development, and environmental degradation. These
factors typically increase social tensions and outmigration, yet, they wil not
produce large flows of asylum seekers unless political upheaval also OCcurs. This
24
is frequently, but not always the case. For instance, areas of Central America and
Southeast Asia that recently produced huge refugee flows ar now evidently
entering a period of relative peace and political stabilzation.
Other aras, including pars of the Midde East and much of Africa, wil no doubt
remain refugee-producing regions. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
political disintegration has created extreme uncertnty, one major and several
small civil wars so far, and a potential for mass movements.
Mass outflows typically create intense pressure on the asylum institution in
neighbouring aras; contemporar communications makes significant flows to
more remote countres possible as welL All indications suggest that the pressure
on Western Europe wil remain high and probably increase in the foreseeable
futur. In Europe, as in the affluent and industralized states of the North
generally, asylum poses paricular problems because these have long be en
receiving - but not sending - countres for refugees. The asymmetr in
dependence weakens the institution: asylum becomes a one-sided obligation for the
rich, resembling aid transfers. Unlike foreign aid, however, asylum means
accepting new members into the community, of ten on a permanent basis. During
much of the Cold War, admission was ideologically justified and reinforced by
fresh memories of the refugee crisis in the Western world itself during the 1930s
and the 1940s. This epoch is now cio sin g, as the debate over Article 16 in the
German Constitution symbolizes. In the post-cold war world, the rationale for
granting asylum in the Nort rests on the uncertain base of humanitaranism and
a general interest of states in upholding international order. Moreover, inherent
suspicion that asylum-seeking in the affluent North is in part a disguised migration
also weakens the institution.
In policy terms, this points to threeareas of challenge. First, the institution of
asylum itself must be made more efficient, both with respect to screening
mechanisms and the capacity to provide different types of protection (e.g.
temporar versus permanent). Second, receiving states must recognize that
refugees themselves represent productive assets that can be mobilzed to reduce
the costs of asylum. In the African con text, this has been much discussed as a
means of securing mass asylum in poor states. For states in the North, it suggests
closer integration between refugee and immigration policy, as discussed in Canada.
For instance, asylum seekers in Western Europe presently represent from one third
to one half of the regular immigration. In an emergency situation, immigration
might be reduced to accommodate more refugees, and vice versa. While refugees
may not meet all immigration criteria, eventual substitution of refugee for
immigrant in terms of skils is probably possible.
Even assuming progress in these respects, the demand for asylum wil probably
grow. A basic policy clarfication is therefore required. As a lon 
g-time advisor to
the UNHCR notes, some of the current pressure on the institution stems from the
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notion that asylum can be used to attain programatic rights and redress general
wrongs (e.g. religious discrimination, systemic exploitation and denialof political
paricipation (Jaeger, 1992). The institution of asylum, however, has developed
historically and legally to provide special benefits in situations of unusual harship
such as war and persecution. Where the line is drawn in practice between, say,
discrimination and persecution wil var. But at a time of considerable pressur
on the institution of asylum itself, it is important not to lose sight of its essence.
Generally , programatic rights must be dealt with through long-term policies that
address the sources of conflct. Root cause strategies include development policy,
promotion of human rights, and peace-makng, and are in curent UN discourse
considered par of a "comprehensive refugee policy" (ILO\HCR, 1992, Suhrke,
1992). The UNHCR as an organization, however, can play only a limited role in
this area, mainly by focusing attention on the interconnections between policy,
violence and refugee flows.
The UNHCR can be more active in an intermediate area of prevention. Termed
"preventive protection" during the Yugoslav crisis, the strategy consists of
establishing UNHCR presence in or near conflct aras so as to provide relief and
protection and, simultaneously, deter furher violence (UNHCR, 1992). The strategy
is c10sely related to current tendencies to internalize asylum, which has as its main
objective the prevention of mass outflows. As discussed above, the implications
are not unproblematic.
The above analysis also has more specific policy relevance.
5.1 Asylum
Two types of asylum must be noted at the outset: individual applications for
protection under the UN Convention or equivalent instrments, and mass
displacement caused by war or other social disasters that most immediately require
temporar protection.
5.1.1 Individual asylum: Access to seek asylum is at the core of the institution in
its contemporar legal-philosophical form. if access is provided, it is easier to
effect the second and necessary par of the operation, Le. to return persons with
unfounded claims. The problem of manifestly unfounded claims that may c10g the
prOCess has no easy solutions, and was a main stumbling block for attempts to
create a Convention on Asylum in the late 1970s.
International cooperation can greatly reduce the costs of the asylum process (Le.
costs to the asylum seekers as well as the receiving society). A major problem in
Europe, parlyaIso in the Americas, is that separate national jurisdictions permit
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asylum seekers to fie claims in several places ("asylum shopping"), and enable
states to pursue beggar-thy-neighbour policies by returing refugees to the last
"safe countr" transited. Since liberal states wil attact a disproportonate number
of c1aims, the res ult is a competitive process among states to exc1ude.
The alternative is an international regime that grants asylum through a common
process and unified criteria, and which allocates the beneficiares among member
states according to mutual needs, capabilties and preferences. As professor
Adelman has argued, this would be "shar responsibilty in its authentic sense",
and also provide reasonable securty and freedom to the asylees (Adelma 1992).
It would be an advanced version of the present UNHCR system of quota refugees,
whereby states subscribe to a num ber of refugees who as a result can move from
first asylum areas to resettlement.
The haronization of asylum policies in Europe sine e the mid-1980s represents
a step in this direction. As yet, however, the European regime is a half-way house
that promises reduced costs to the states but less freedom for the asylum seekers.
The competitive process to exclude stil prevails. The same applies to relations
between Nort America and Europe, and U.S.- Canadian relations. There is an
urgent need, therefore, to move regional and international asylum regimes forward.
5.1.2 Temporary protection: Historieally, situations of generalized violence
including civil and international war have caused large population displacement
and permanent migration. These flows were most readily received when there was
a strong political rationale for doing so, or when refugees met immigration eriteria.
Without such conditions, the response to large refugee flows must be temporary
protection.
At present, temporar protection is discussed as the optimal solution for mass
flows from conflcts such as civil war (Yugoslavia), religious-ethnic pogroms
(Myanmar), and miltar coup (Haiti). In all cases, the conflct appears as a
temporar deviation from - if not peace - at least some degree of normalcy.
There is a presumption that the status quo ante can be restored, possibly with the
aid of international pressure and diplomacy. if neighbouring states host large
refugee populations awaiting return, they c1early have an incentive to find an end
to the conflct. The primar need is thus to providemass protection to all victims
and vulnerable groups in an interim period.
Some elements are already there. Certain states give varous forms of temporary
protection. Mass protection without individual determnation of eligibilty has been
par of the UNHCR mandate in developing countres since the 1960s. Rudimentar
regimes aleady exist in the form of international, typically regional, coordination
to deal with refugee-producing crises. What remains is to formalize this into
predictable, collective action.
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The logic is the same that applies to individual asylum. In a crisis, refugees wil
flee towards the most accessible, safe areas. Because the costs of denying
protection can be high in terms of death and suffering - the ultima ratio of
humanitaranism revealed - neighbouring countres find it difficult to do so
consistently. Yet, a system of burden-sharng wil ease the task. Ad hoc
arangements in individual crisis situations do not add up to a regime; the very
essenee of a regime is to establish norms for joint management of a common but
unevenly impacting problem. The presumed result is areasonably efficient and
equitable process that enhances international order (Krasner, 1983). In the long
run, it is clearly in the interest of most states to have areliable framework for
burden- sharg, since no one knows on whose frontier refugees wil appear next.
5.1.3 Institutional reforms in the international refugee regime: Reflecting the
pattern of refugee flows, formalized refugee regimes wil probably mean greater
regionalization in response. This wil accentuate the obligation of richer regions
and states to transfer funds to poor and hard-pressed areas. As the massive crisis
in Somalia in 1992 demonstrates, acceptance in principle may not be sufficient.
To avoid fragmentation, it is also advisable to retain the UNHCR as the primary
agent of refugee protection. Previous attempts to develop regional protection
agencies failed, nota bly under the OAS in 1967 (Yundt, 1989). The UNHCR itself,
however, suffers from a strctural weakness that again was revealed by the
Yugoslav crisis. Without a secure financial base, the organization remains hostage
to the political interests of the principal donors. As a result, the only organization
in the UN system that has avested interest in protecting refugees is often
prevented from raising this very issue forcefully. On the other hand, assessed
contrbutions from member states would constitute a secure financial base only to
the extent that members actually paid their dues.
5.2 Research needs
Growing pressure on the asylum institution in many pars of the world has
generated a search for adjustment through innovative asylum mechanisms,
streamlining of procedure, new aid strategies and collective action. Some of these
issues ar relatively new, with only a scattered and incomplete scholarly literature.
More social science research in these areas would provide a firmer foundation for
policy. This includes the origin and nature of regional refugee regimes, systems
of temporar protection (including conditions for return), possibilties for
integration of refugee policy and immigration policy, and conditions as well as full
implications of strategies of "preventive protection".
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Table 3
Countres of origin raned according to their contrbution of 75 per cent
of all asylum applications submitted in Europe durng 1983-19891
19832 1984 1985 1986
Sri Laa 8,85 Sri Laa 13,41 Sri Laa 17,66 Iran 18.96
Iran 8.04 Iran 11.60 Iran 12,71 Poland 10,28
Turkey 7.99 Poland 10.96 Turkey 9,91 Turkey 9,81
Poland 7.83 Turkey 10.71 Poland 8,50 Lebanon 6.13
Czecho- 6.64 Varous 5.29 Lebanon 5.23 Ghana 5,28
slovaka
Viet Nam 5.94 Czecho- 5.26 Ghana 5.13 Sri Laa 5.24
slavika
Cambodia 5.04 Ghana 5.16 Varous 4.06 Varous 4,91
Ghana 4,80 Romania 3,53 Other Afria 4.00 Other Africa 4,37
Zaire 4.68 Lebanon 3.41 India 3.37 India 4,01
Romana 4,47 Ethopia 3.39 Czecho- 2,88 Romania 3,49
slovakia
Other Afca 3.79 Other Afrca 3.33 Paksta 2.86 Paksta 2.51
Hungar 3.03 Czecho- 2.36
slovakia
India 2.95
Chile 2.72
Total 76,77 76.03 7631 77.34
No,of countres 14 11 11 12
1987 1988 1989 1983-1989
Turkey 14,53 Poland 18,96 Turkey 16,87 Turkey 13,28
Poland 11.60 Turkey 15.13 Romania 13,61 Poland 1 1.58
Iran 1 1.23 Yugoslavia 10,29 Poland 9,78 Iran 10.12
USSR 5,59 Iran 8.36 Yugoslavia 7,53 Sri Laa 7,38
Other Africa 5.29 Romania 4,57 Sri Laa 5,75 Romania 6,35
Sri Laa 4,40 Other Africa 4,03 Iran 4,33 Yugoslavia 4.95
Yugoslavia 4,24 Sri Laa 3.52 Lebanon 4,28 Other Africa 4,24
Hungar 3.84 Lebanon 2,90 Other Africa 4,22 Lebanon 3.87
Romania 3,70 Zaie 2,89 Zaie 3.10 Ghana 3.62
Chile 3,67 Chile 2.77 Somala 2,75 Zaire 2.83
Ghana 3,34 Hungar 2,55 Bulgara 2,31 Checho- 2.83
slovakia
Zaie 3,22 Ghana 2,31 India 2.54
Czecho- 2,82 Paksta 2.45
slovaka
Total 77,48 75.97 76.83 76.04
No, of 13 11 12 13
countres
i "Various" refers to a category of asylum applicants with no further indication of nationality.
2 Figure includes Indochinese arived in 1983 under French resettlement quota.
Source: Hovey, B. (1992), based on UNHCR data.
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Table 4
Anual numher of asylum applications by Europan countr origin submitted hetween 1983 and 1991
Countr of 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
origin (thousands)1
Albana * * * * * * 5 27 34
Bulgara * * * * * L 8 13 17 17
Czecho- 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 2 2 2
slovaka
Hungar 2 2 3 4 7 6 3 1 1 1
Poland 6 11 14 21 21 44 34 16 8 8
Romana 3 4 4 7 7 11 47 80 64 64
USSR * * * * 10 1 1 5 11 11
Yugoslavia 1 2 3 8 24 26 33 115 115
Other 1 * * * * * * *
T otai2 19 24 30 41 58 91 128 155 245 791
(percentages)
Albania 2,9 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 3.2 11.0 4,3
Bulgara 1.7 1.7 1.4 1. 0,6 0,6 6.3 8,4 6,9 5.2
Czecho- 25.1 21.9 16.2 11.7 8.8 5.1 5.8 1.3 .8 5.2
slovakia
Hungar 11.4 9.3 10,5 10.1 11.9 6.6 2,7 .6 .4 3.8
Poland 29.5 45,7 47,7 51.0 36.1 48,7 26.5 10.3 3.3 22.1
Romania 16.9 14,7 15.0 17,3 11.5 11.7 36.9 51.6 26.1 28.7
USSR 0,7 0.4 0.5 0.3 17.4 0.6 1.0 3,2 4,5 3,5
Yugoslavia 4.9 4.1 6.9 6,8 13.2 26,4 20.4 21.3 46,9 26.9
Other 6.8 0,6 0.2 0,9 0,2 0.2 0.3 * * *
* = less than 500 applications. (1) Rounded to nearest '00. (2) Totals may differ due to rounding.
Source: Statistical Tables, IGC. Geneva 1992; and Hovy, B" 1992
Table 5
Asylees and refugees in select countres in Europe and North America 1989
Asylum-seekers Refugees resettled and
persons granted asylum
Canada 22,00 35,00
France 60,00 8,711
Germany 121,318 5,991
Netherlands 13,900 2,955
Norway 4,00 7,450
Sweden 32,00 23,961
Switzerland 24,500 821
United Kingdom 16.00 1,587
United States 100,00
106,250
(97,021+9,229)1
1) Refugees resettled and persons granted asylum.
Source: Inter-govemmental Consultations on Asylum. Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North
America and Asutralia (IGC), Geneva; and U,S, Department of State, World Refugee Report, Washington
D.C" September 1990.
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Table 6
Migrants and asylum-seekers in selecte OECD couniries
(in thousands)
1985
Asylum-seekers
5.3
28,8
73,8
5,6
0.8
14,5
9.7
5.4
16.6
Belgium
Francel
Germany
Netherlands
Norway2
Sweden3
Switzerland4
United Kigdom'
United States6
Migrants
37.5
43,4
324.4
40.6
14,9
13,4
59.4
55.4
534,0
Migrants
43.5
53,2
649,5
51.5
14.0
28.9
83.4
49,7
534,0
1989
Asylum-seekers
8.1
61.4
121.3
13.9
4,4
30,0
24,4
16.5
100,0
1) Eniries of new foreign workers. including holders of provisional work permits (APT) and foreigners
admtted on famy rewufication grounds, Does not include residents of EEC countres (workers and
family member) who have not been brought in by the International Migration Offce (OMI).
2) Eniries of foreigners intending to stay longer than sIx month in Norway,
3) Some short duration entres are not counted (maily citizens of other Nordic couniries),
4) Eniries of foreigners with anual residence permits, and those with settlement permits (peanent pets)
who retu to Switzerland after a temporar stay abroad, Includes, up to 31st December 1982. holders of
permits of durations below 12 month, Seasonal and frontier workers (including seasonal workers who
obta permanent permits) are excluded.
5) Eniries correspond to peanent settlers within the meang of 1971 Imigration Act and subsequent
amendments,
6) Legal ceiling until1990.
Source: SOPEMI. Trends in International Migration. OECD, Paris 1992 and U,S./Imigration and
Natualization Service, Statistical Tables.
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Western Europe*
Table 7
Registered refugees from forer Yugoslavia, June-August 1992
Formal asylum-seekers Total Visa restr. on pesons
from former Yugoslavia
Yes (BH only)
No
Yes
Yes (BH only)
Waived
Yes
No
12,00
1,100 (1,500)
1,800 (1)
146,00
1,600
9,500
1.900 (12600)
50,00Austria
Denmark**
France***
Germany
Itay
Netherlands+
Norway
Spai
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kigdom
Others
Sub-total
Hungar
Total
From Bosnia
Herzegovina
Internally displaced
Croatia
Slovenia
Total
200,00
11,00
10,00
41,800
9-16,600
26,000
1,600 (1724)
50,00
18,00
n,a.
n,a,
n,a, n.a.
No
231,700
25.00
231,700
350,()
50-60,00
410,000
No
1,00,00
700,00
63,00
1,763,000
1) Including visitors visa, family ties and other categories of entr
2) Estimated origin: Kosovo - 170 00. Bosnia Herzegovina - 80 00. Croatia - 70 00, Serbia-Montenegro -
30 00
3) ca. 20 00 Croatian
4) Of which possibly including 35 00 Croatians
* Belgium: aggregate figures not available, Monthy anvals ca, 2-300 in July -92.
** 100-150 arvals monthy
*** Rough estimate
+ 4-600 arivals per week since early July
Source: UNHCR, Der Spiegel (1992).
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Figure 1
Asylum applications in partcipating states 1970-1992
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Source: Intergovemmental consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe-
Nort America and Australia (IGC), Geneva, Statistical Tables. 1992,
Figure 2
Annual asylum applications in European regions 1983-1991
in Lhousands
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Nordie: Denmark, Finlad, Norway, Sweden. EEC: All 12 except Luxembourg.
Source: UNHCR, as cited in Hovy (1992). .
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